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Abstract. The statistical fluctuations in free-space links in the turbulent atmosphere
are important for the distribution of quantum signals. To that end, we first study
statistics generated by the turbulent atmosphere in an entanglement based free-space
quantum key distribution (QKD) system. Using the insights gained from this analysis,
we study the effect of link fluctuations on the security and key generation rate of decoy
state QKD concluding that it has minimal effect in the typical operating regimes. We
then investigate the novel idea of using these turbulent fluctuations to our advantage
in QKD experiments. We implement a signal-to-noise ratio filter (SNRF) in our QKD
system which rejects measurements during periods of low transmission efficiency, where
the measured quantum bit error rate (QBER) is temporarily elevated. Using this, we
increase the total secret key generated by the system from 78,009 bits to 97,678 bits,
representing an increase of 25.2% in the final secure key rate, generated from the same
raw signals. Lastly, we present simulations of a QKD exchange with an orbiting LEO
satellite and show that an SNRF will be extremely useful in such a situation, allowing
many more passes to extract a secret key than would otherwise be possible.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD), one of the first experimentally realizable technologies
from the field of quantum information, has by now seen a number of robust
implementations both in fibre [1, 2, 3, 4] and free-space [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Indeed, it has
already reached the level of maturity so as to be offered as a commercial product from a
number of companies [11, 12, 13, 14]. While the fastest systems to date are based on fibre
transmission media [15], they will remain limited to a transmission distance of about
200 km until reliable quantum repeaters are realized. Even taking into account expected
future advances in fibre, source, and detector technology, secure key distribution will
still be limited to about 400 km using fibres.
QKD with orbiting satellites has long been proposed as a solution for global
key distribution, as evidenced by the growing number of feasibility studies that have
been conducted [10, 16, 17, 18, 19]. QKD with low earth orbit (LEO) satellites
likely represents the most feasible solution since they will have the shortest free-space
transmission distance with the lowest losses. However, LEO satellites travel quickly with
short orbital periods limiting the time available to perform QKD during a single pass
to the order of 300 sec [19, 10]. Thus, it is important to have a thorough understanding
of the transmission properties of the free-space channel which the photons will travel
through in order to properly evaluate the feasibility of such a system. As well, with
such a short time to exchange a key, it is important to extract the most secure key bits
from the relatively small number of signals sent and received during a pass.
To these ends, this article first examines some recent theoretical work on the
transfer of quantum light and entanglement through the turbulent atmosphere; then
experimentally determined free-space transmission efficiency curves measured with an
entanglement based free-space QKD system are analyzed; this is followed by a discussion
of the implications of link fluctuations on decoy state QKD; a method for improving
free-space QKD key rates in the turbulent atmosphere through the use of a signal-to-
noise ratio filter (SNRF) is then put forward; followed by the experimental results of
implementing such a filter and their implications for the security of the system.
2. Free-Space Optical Link Statistics
The propagation of classical light through turbulent atmosphere has long been of
interest in theoretical investigations, including such diverse phenomena as diffraction,
scintillation, and the absorption of light by molecules in the atmosphere which produce
beam wander and broadening [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Satellite based communication has
also been investigated in the context of a turbulent atmosphere [26, 27, 24, 25]. From
these studies it has been shown that the intensity fluctuations due to the turbulent
atmosphere can be assumed to be log-normally distributed in the regime of weak
fluctuations and strong losses. This has also been confirmed in various experiments
(see e.g. [28]).
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Recently, Vasylyev, Semenov and Vogel [29, 30, 31] have provided a theoretical
foundation for studying the influence of fluctuating loss channels on the transmission
of quantum and entangled states of light. Like others [32, 28], in Refs. [30, 31] they
approximate the probability distribution of the (fluctuating) atmospheric transmission
coefficient (PDTC) in the case of entanglement distribution according to the log-normal
distribution:
P(ηatm) = 1√
2piσηatm
exp
[
− 1
2
(
ln ηatm + θ¯
σ
)2]
(1)
where ηatm is the atmospheric transmittance, θ = − ln < ηatm > is the logarithm of the
mean atmospheric transmittance, and σ is the variance of θ = − ln ηatm characterizing
the atmospheric turbulence.
Equation 1 only describes in a simplified way the transmission property of an
atmospheric channel and ignores any phase (front) fluctuations. This is sufficient for our
analysis because our experiments utilize the direct detection of single photons, making
the phase nature of the transmission irrelevant.
2.1. Measuring Free-Space Link Statistics with Entangled Photons
To begin, we measured the free-space transmission efficiency statistics in our
entanglement based QKD system. The system is comprised of a compact Sagnac
interferometric entangled photon source [33, 34, 35] operating at 808 nm, a 1,305 m
free-space optical link where the outgoing/incoming beam is expanded/contracted by
the use of appropriate telescopes (the telescopes have a 75 mm collection lens and a
25:1 magnification), two compact passive polarization analysis modules, quad module
silicon avalanche photodiode single photon detectors (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQ4C, ∼50%
detection efficiency, ∼400 dark counts/sec), time-tagging units, GPS time receivers, two
laptop computers, and custom written software [7]. We choose to work at a wavelength
of 808 nm to take advantage of a peak in the typical atmospheric transmission [19] as
well as high detection efficiency at that wavelength in our detectors. Usually there is a
10 nm interference filter at the entrance of the polarization detector box used to reject
background light; however, we remove it for all experiments in this paper in order to
simulate a scenario (such as a satellite link) with a higher background noise level in
order to test the usefulness of our signal-to-noise ratio filter, described later.
Brida et al. [36] were the first to suggest using two photon entangled states for the
absolute quantum efficiency calibration of photodetectors. We adapt their method here
to measure the PDTC of the free-space channel by first performing a local experiment
with the same equipment (source, polarization analyzers, photon detectors) so that we
can measure the various other efficiencies of the system. Then through comparison of
the experiments performed locally and over the free-space we can extract the PDTC of
the link.
In a local experiment we expect the number of counts per second seen by Alice
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(NA) and Bob (NB) to be given by
NA = NηA = NηAsourceηApolηAdet (2)
NB = NηB = NηBsourceηBpolηBdet (3)
where N is the total number of pairs produced at the source per second, ηA is
Alice’s total transmission efficiency (comprised of the source coupling efficiency, ηAsource ,
polarization analyzer efficiency, ηApol , and detector efficiency, ηAdet), and similarly for
Bob. Additionally, the expected number of observed coincidences per second (Ncoin)
between Alice and Bob, found using a coincidence window (∆tcoin) to identify entangled
photon pairs, is given by
Ncoin = NηAηB. (4)
Dividing the measured coincidence count rate (Ncoin) by the observed singles rate at
Alice (NA) yields an estimate for the total loss caused by Bob’s optics (ηB) including
the source coupling, polarization analyzer, and photon detectors. Double pair emissions,
where two photon pairs are created in the source crystal at once, could lead to corrections
in Eqs. 4-7 at sufficiently high pump powers. However, for the experiments detailed here,
the pumping strength was sufficiently low that double pair emissions were negligible and
thus safely ignored.
For experiments performed over the free-space link, the equation for Bob’s singles
rate gets modified to
NB = NηB +Nbackground
= NηBsourceηBatmηBpolηBdet +Nbackground (5)
where his total transmission efficiency, ηB, now includes a term for the link transmission
efficiency, ηBatm , and an additional term, Nbackground, is added representing background
photons which are collected and measured by Bob’s receiver. The equation for the
coincidence rate is similarly modified to
Ncoin = NηAηB +Naccidental (6)
where Naccidental represents accidental coincidences of Alice’s measurements with the
background photons measured by Bob. Fortunately, the accidental rate given to good
approximation by
Naccidental ≈ NANB∆tcoin (7)
can be easily estimated by finding the number of coincidences between Alice’s
measurements and Bob’s measurements shifted by a few coincidence windows and then
subtracted from the results.
To find the free-space link PDTC we divide the coincidence rate (Ncoin) observed
during a link experiment by Alice’s local single photon count rates (NA) which gives the
PDTC for Bob’s total loss, ηB, including all of the losses in his equipment. Then, using
the estimate from the local experiment, we divide out the losses from Bob’s equipment
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leaving only the atmospheric transmission, ηBatm , allowing us to construct the PDTC for
the free-space channel. There is an alternative method for estimating the free-space link
PDTC using only the singles rates from an experiment over a free-space link. However,
the method just described using coincidences is more accurate than using just the singles
rates since the only source of error is the accidental coincidence rate (Naccidental) which
we can estimate and remove.
We studied three different scenarios with our system for the distribution of
entangled photons over free-space channels corresponding to the following conditions:
a maximum free-space transmission with optimized pointing and focusing parameters
(Fig. 1 (a)), a transmission with artificially increased turbulence using a heat gun
to heat the air immediately in front of the sending telescope (Fig. 1 (b)), and a
defocused transmission as a way to simulate larger losses (Fig. 1 (c)). For each of these
experiments, the data was broken up into blocks of a certain duration which we call the
block duration and then the efficiency was estimated for each block using the method
described above. These results are then summed up into a histogram, normalized, and
displayed as the PDTC for that link. In all cases, the distributions are shown with
a block duration of 10 ms since it has been shown that this is the typical timescale
for atmospheric turbulence[28]. All measurements were performed on August 24, 2011
between the hours of 12 and 1am since the system requires the reduced background
experienced at night to operate, with a total data acquisition time for each experiment
of 3 minutes. The temperature was approximately 18◦C with clear visibility in an urban
environment with typical city illumination levels.
Fig. 1 (a) shows that we experienced extremely good atmospheric conditions during
the experiments since the observed transmission coefficient for the well aligned link was
very close to a Poissonian distribution. The term Poissonian here really refers to the
original graphs of integer photon counts versus the frequency with which they were
observed. We would expect the transmission coefficient for a local system without
a free-space link to be Poissonian in nature owing to the pair creation process and
detection. The fact that we still observe a Poissonian distribution with a free-space link
implies that our atmospheric conditions were very good since the presence of the link
did not alter the nature of the statistics.
The defocussed transmission case, Fig. 1 (c), is also very close to a Poissonian
distribution only narrowed with a decreased overall transmittance compared to Fig. 1
(a). This is expected since defocusing the beam increased it to a size larger than the
receiver telescope thus causing fluctuations in the transmission efficiency experienced
over the free-space link to be smoothed out (ie. causing it to be even closer to a
Poissonian distribution) while at the same time lowering the overall transmittance since
many more photons missed the receiver telescope and consequently were not collected
and measured. For the experiment where turbulence was artificially added by letting
the beam pass over hot air produced by a heat gun, Fig. 1 (b), the distribution indeed
changes towards a log-normal distribution as predicted.
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Figure 1. Probability distribution of the transmission coefficient (PDTC) for the
case of (a) an optimized free-space channel, (b) a free-space channel with artificially
increased turbulence using a heat gun placed in front of the sending telescope, and (c)
a free-space channel where the beam is defocused in order to simulate larger losses.
The detection (sampling) time was 10 ms.
3. Effect of Link Fluctuations on Decoy State QKD
Having investigated the PDTC for a number of different free-space channels in the
previous section, we now turn our attention to the question of what effect atmospheric
turbulence might have on weak coherent pulse QKD with decoy states. Attenuated
lasers, while convenient for QKD, do not emit true single photons but rather a mixture
of photon number states following a Poissonian distribution. This limits the distance
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over which QKD can be performed as Eve can perform a photon number splitting attack
to gain full information on multi-photon pulses [37]. This attack relies on Eve’s ability
to block single photon pulses and thus modifies the channel transmission nonlinearly
depending on the photon number. However, this attack can be detected through the
use of decoy states of various pulse strengths [38, 39], and an additional step in the
security phase which verifies that the channel transmission does not depend on the
mean photon number. Thus, it is crucial for free space QKD systems using decoy states
to consider atmospheric fluctuation since the security of the protocol depends strongly
on the relative transmission of the various pulse strengths.
Here we investigate whether the assumption of a static channel for determining
secure key length is valid when the channel is, in reality, fluctuating. We consider a
one-decoy protocol from Ma et al. [40], including the “tighter bound” from section E.2,
along with the PDTC generated from the photon statistics in atmosphere taken from
[28], and with a realistic error correction efficiency of f(e) = 1.22 used. Figures 2 and
3 compare the results from a simulation of secure key rates based on a simple static
channel versus a channel fluctuating with a log-normal distribution.
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Figure 2. Secure key rate versus the turbulence parameter, σ, comparing static (solid
line) and fluctuating channel (dashed line) with same mean loss. Average channel
losses are indicated for the four curves. Deviation is only apparent at very strong
turbulence, meaning the static channel approximation is sufficient for most cases.
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Figure 3. Secure key rate versus loss, comparing a static quantum channel (solid line)
to a fluctuating free-space quantum channel (dashed line) with same mean loss. Figure
a) considers “good” atmosphere with σ = 0.18, resulting in no deviation between the
static and fluctuating channel. Figure b) considers “bad” atmosphere with σ = 1.8,
resulting in less secure key for the fluctuating channel at low loss.
Fig. 2 shows that approximating a fluctuating channel as a static channel with
the same mean loss is sufficient so long as the atmosphere is not extremely turbulent.
It should be noted that the turbulence model of Milonni et al. [28] begins to fail at
extremely high turbulence levels possibly leading to inaccuracies in the extreme right
portion of Fig. 2. Unfortunately, we are unaware of a correct high turbulence free-
space link model to replace it with in this regime. Nevertheless, we can still draw
important conclusions in the usual operating scenarios. Further, at moderate turbulence
strengths Fig. 3 shows that the static channel approximation is valid as long as the
channel loss is above ∼15 dB, a typical condition in long distance free-space QKD
(see Ref. [19] for example scenarios). Therefore, the security of weak coherent pulse
QKD with decoy states is not significantly affected by a fluctuating free-space quantum
channel as compared to the usual assumed static channel since the differences only arise
in a situation where the high turbulence would likely make a successful transmission
impossible or with a link with such low losses that the transmission distance is likely
uninteresting. This also paves the way for checking whether the key rates could possibly
be improved with a signal-to-noise ratio filter.
4. Improving QKD with a Signal-to-Noise Ratio Filter
Using the link statistics analysis and the data from the experiments above, we now
investigate the use of a signal-to-noise ratio filter (SNRF) in order to increase the final
key rate in QKD systems with a turbulent quantum transmission channel. The idea of
the SNRF is to throw away data blocks where the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) was low
based on a directly measurable quantity, the signal strength, under the assumption that
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the noise caused by background events remains constant. While this has the consequence
of decreasing the overall raw key rate, it is possible to actually improve the final secret
key rate since we omit the blocks where the SNR was lower and correspondingly the
QBER was inflated by the larger relative contribution from the background. We mention
that similar filtering techniques have been explored in the continuous variable regime,
though the effect of fading on CV quantum states is very different. Fading and excess
noise quickly destroy Gaussian quantum features such as entanglement and purity of
states; however, different possibilities have been offered to recover these [41, 42].
We define the SNRF algorithm as follows. One begins by measuring the background
contribution of the quantum free-space channel (in terms of a count rate) with the
entangled source switched off. Then one defines the singles contribution from the
source divided by the background contributions as the dimensionless SNR. One then
throws away low SNR blocks where the background contribution is proportionally higher
according to a preset SNR threshold. The idea can also be mapped to real coincidences
from the source divided by background coincidences where these numbers now implicitly
depend on the coincidence window used.
In the following, we implement the equivalent algorithm where rather than using
the dimensionless SNR we instead use the singles rates to define our threshold. The
SNR threshold is implicitly used in this protocol since the background noise is assumed
to remain constant. Thus, examining the optimum singles rate threshold effectively
amounts to finding the optimum SNR threshold since one could calculate this number
by first measuring the background, subtract it from the total measured singles, and then
divide the remainder by the measured background to arrive at the SNR. In the remainder
of this paper we will refer to all such equivalent protocols as a SNRF algorithm.
Fig. 4 shows (a) Alice’s local rates (red curve) and Bob’s singles count rates
measured over the link (blue curve) along with the coincidence count rate (green curve)
and (b) the corresponding QBER’s measured in the Z (blue curve) and X (green curve)‡
bases when no SNRF is used for the artificially increased turbulence experiment of Fig.
1 (b). Whereas, Fig. 4 (c) shows Alice and Bob’s singles and coincidence rates when
the optimum SNRF threshold of 95,000 counts/sec (discussed below) is applied, and (d)
shows the corresponding QBER. The data points are grouped according to the optimum
block duration of 30 ms (thus, each data point represents 30 ms worth of data) and a
coincidence window of 5 ns is used. Here one can clearly see the high background
detection rate experienced by Bob (a situation that will be typical of a QKD link
performed to an orbiting satellite) as the flat bottom of his singles rate graph (Fig. 4
(a) blue curve), as well as the wildly varying coincidence rates (Fig. 4 (a) green curve)
where the points close to the x-axis largely consist of accidental coincidences. From
Fig. 4 (a) blue curve, we can estimate Bob’s mean background count rate at roughly
2,700 counts/sec. Each background count which is registered as a valid coincidence
will be uncorrelated with Alice’s measurements and contribute a 50% error rate to the
‡ The Z basis here refers to the basis of the Pauli σZ operator (ie. horizontal and vertical polarization),
while the X basis refers to the basis of the Pauli σX operator (ie. +45
◦ and -45◦ polarization).
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QBER.
The SNRF idea is neatly illustrated here by looking at the many high QBER values,
corresponding to the low signal phases in Fig. 4 (b) associated with Bob’s low singles
and coincidence rates from the top graph. We know from the experiment corresponding
to Fig. 1 (a) for the well aligned link that the intrinsic QBER is ∼2.34%; however; the
QBER observed for the turbulent link corresponding to Fig. 1 (b) and Fig. 4 (a) and
(b) was instead ∼5.51%. This increase in the measured QBER over the actual QBER
of the system will lower the final secret key rates. However, one can see that when the
low SNR regions are removed from the singles and coincidence graph (Fig. 4 (c)) using
the optimum SNRF, many of the corresponding high QBER blocks (Fig. 4 (d)) are also
removed. Thus, we are able to lower the measured QBER from ∼5.51% to ∼4.30%, a
value closer to the intrinsic error rate of the system, allowing the system to generate
many more secret key bits than would otherwise be possible.
The secret key rate formula for our system expressed in secret key bits per raw key
bit is given by [43]
R =
1
2
(1− f(e)h2(e)− h2(e)) (8)
where f(e) is the error correction inefficiency as a function of the error rate, normally
f(e) ≥ 1 with f(x) = 1 at the Shannon limit, and h2(e) = −e log e− (1− e) log(1− e) is
the binary entropy function. For the clarity of the argument we have used the infinite
key limit formula; however, the insights gained should transfer to the finite key limit.
Looking at Eq. 8, we can see that a higher QBER is detrimental to the final key
rate for two reasons (a) increased error correction inefficiency and (b) increased privacy
amplification. The Cascade algorithm [44, 45] and low density parity check (LDPC)
codes [46, 47, 48, 49] are the two most commonly employed error correction algorithms
used in QKD systems. As the QBER climbs the number of parities revealed (and
correspondingly the information about the key which has to be accounted for in privacy
amplification) increases. This applies even in the ideal case of error correction algorithms
operating at the Shannon limit. Privacy amplification is then used after error correction
to squeeze out any potential eavesdropper and ensure that the probability that anyone
besides Alice and Bob knows the final key is exponentially small at the cost of shrinking
the size of the final key. Privacy amplification is commonly accomplished by applying
a two-universal hash function [50, 51] to the error corrected key and then using Eq. 8
to determine how many bits from this operation may be kept for the final secret key.
Both the number of bits exposed during error correction and the measured QBER are
used to determine the final size of the key. Additionally, the secure key rate formula
is a non-linear function of the QBER so that decreasing the QBER does better than a
linear improvement in the final key rate [52]. Thus, the fewer parities revealed during
error correction and the lower we can make the measured QBER, the larger the final
key will be.
The use of a SNRF could potentially open a loophole in the security proofs for QKD
since we are now discarding data (which is typically not allowed by the proofs) depending
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Figure 4. Alice’s local single count rate (red curves, left axis), Bob’s single count
rate measured over the link (blue curves, left axis), the coincidence rate (green curves,
right axis), and QBER in the Z (blue curve) and X (green curve) bases for the high
free-space turbulence experiment of Fig. 1 (b) for the case of (a-b) no SNRF and (c-d)
the optimum SNRF of 95,000 singles/sec. The data points are grouped according to
the optimum block duration of 30 ms and a coincidence window of 5 ns is used.
Studying Free-Space Transmission Statistics and Improving Free-Space QKD in the Turbulent Atmosphere12
on Bob’s measured singles rates. However, we are implementing the SNRF on Bob’s
singles rate which is a sum over all of his detectors during a block of data, so the SNRF is
detector independent. Additionally, discarding data should be equivalent to a decrease
in the channel transmission efficiency (which could happen anyways due to atmospheric
effects) and thus should not affect the security proof. One might initially think that
measuring the SNRF in real-time could thwart a potential eavesdropper; however, any
real-time measurement would require a probe beam either of a different wavelength or
propagating in a different spatial mode so that it could be easily separated from the
signal photons. This difference would easily allow an eavesdropper to fake whatever
background they wished on the probe beam while leaving the signal beam untouched.
Therefore, for this paper we assume that using a SNRF does not compromise the security
of our system; however, we stress that it remains an open question whether security can
be proven for this scenario. We also point out that for an entangled QKD protocol
security does not depend on the transmission of the quantum channel; whereas, if one
wanted to use a SNRF in a decoy state protocol, which works by measuring the channel
gain for each photon number component, the issue of security would be delicate and
require careful analysis so as not to open up any security loopholes. We hope that by
showing the utility of the SNRF methods we can stimulate work on proving its security.
Finally, we also mention recent work by Usenko et al. [53] which theoretically studied
the influence of fading on Gaussian states in the framework of the continuous variable
QKD filtering ideas mentioned earlier.
5. Experimental Results and Discussion
After performing some initial simulations which showed the promise of the SNRF idea,
we proceeded to implement the algorithm using the data gathered during the artificially
increased turbulence experiment of Fig. 1 (b). There are three main parameters which
affect the total secret key rate using the SNRF idea: the block duration, the SNRF
threshold, and the coincidence window. The block duration refers to the time-scale on
which the SNRF algorithm is applied and its optimum should be related to the time-
scale of the atmospheric turbulence. The optimum SNRF threshold should be related
to the mean background count rates observed during the experiment. Fig. 5 shows
the results of this analysis, with the total secret key generated from the 3 min block of
data from Fig. 1 (b) plotted against the block duration and the SNRF threshold, for a
coincidence window of 5 ns.
The key rates for the lower SNRF thresholds (closest to the front) in Fig. 5
essentially show the secret key rate one would expect without implementing the SNRF
algorithm (since little if any raw key is thrown away). As the SNRF threshold increases
though (moving towards the top in Fig. 5), one can clearly see that the total secret key
rate also increases until reaching a maximum at which point it quickly falls off since the
SNRF cuts out too much raw key. Less obvious from the figure, but still important,
there is a gradual improvement in the secret key rate as the block duration shrinks until
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Figure 5. The total secret key for the high turbulence free-space experiment of Fig.
1 (b) plotted versus the block duration and the SNRF threshold, using a coincidence
window of 5 ns. The optimum block duration was found to be 30 ms, while the
optimum SNRF threshold was 95,000 counts/sec suitably applied on the timescale of
the optimum block duration.
a maximum is reached at which point the secret key rate gradually decreases once again.
The optimum parameters for this data set were to use a block duration of 30 ms and a
SNRF threshold of 95,000 counts/sec suitably applied on the timescale of the optimum
block duration which increased the total secret key generated to 97,678 bits from the
78,009 bits generated when no SNRF was used. This represents an increase of 25.2% in
the total secret key generated from the same raw key dataset.
As mentioned earlier, the secret key rate given by Eq. 8 is improved due to two
effects. First, the intrinsic error rate in the data is smaller causing the efficiency of the
Cascade error correction algorithm [44, 45] used here to be improved from 1.2631 for the
case of no SNRF to 1.2202 when a SNRF is used. This increased efficiency translates into
fewer bits revealed during error correction and thus few bits sacrificed during privacy
amplification. Secondly, the QBER measured during error correction is smaller, 4.30%
with a SNRF versus 5.51% with none. This translates into less privacy amplification
needed to ensure that the final secret key is secure against an eavesdropper.
In order to aid the potential security analysis of our SNRF idea, we also include
a few other measured values pertinent to its implementation which are summarized in
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Scenario Raw key Sifted key Secret key f QBER
No SNRF 535,530 259,855 78,009 1.2697 5.51%
Above SNRF 466,441 226,279 97,678 1.2202 4.30%
Below SNRF 69,089 33,576 - - 13.77%
Table 1. Measured values for: directly generating key, using the SNRF to generate
key, and data discarded by the SNRF, for the high free-space turbulence experiment
of Fig. 1 (b).
Tab. 1. For the data set shown in Fig. 5, we kept 466,441 coincidences which made
up our raw key while rejecting 69,089 coincidences generated from data blocks that
were below the SNRF threshold. The size of the sifted key, where both Alice and Bob
measured in the same basis, was 226,279 bits while 33,576 bits were rejected by the
SNRF. As mentioned before, the QBER in this sifted key was 4.30% while the QBER
in the rejected data was 13.77%. Here we can clearly see how utilizing the SNRF was
able to increase our overall secret key rate by rejecting this small subset which turns
out to have a much higher QBER.
While the preceding discussion nicely illustrated the usefulness of using the SNRF
idea to produce a larger final key length from the same raw key rates, we now mention
two ideas for how one would actually implement the SNRF algorithm in practice. The
first idea would be in the case of a static scenario (fixed position free-space links) to
use the first few minutes of an experiment to find the optimum SNRF threshold (since
finding the optimum requires the full knowledge of the measurement results) which
would then be used during the rest of the key exchange. For the case of a long distance
key exchange with a quickly changing background one could periodically re-calculate
the ideal SNRF threshold in order to continually operate with the optimum threshold.
In the case of an exchange with an orbiting satellite, for example, one could periodically
re-calculate the optimum every few seconds even as atmospheric conditions changed
over the course of the key exchange. The beauty of the SNRF idea is that it can be
applied completely offline, as the raw data from the key exchange can be saved and
processed with the optimum threshold determined after the satellite has already passed
overhead. Additionally, the user can apply as fine or coarse grained an analysis as they
wish. A second possibility would be to have a catalogue of free-space parameter regimes
and the corresponding optimum SNRF thresholds stored in a look-up table. Then one
could continually monitor the free-space link statistics over the course of a key exchange
(which require only the coincidence events to calculate) and pick the optimum threshold
based on the measured free-space PDTC parameters.
Besides these implementation ideas, there are at least two other possibilities for
future work to augment the protocol. The ideas are similar with the first being to use
an adaptive block duration which expands and contracts depending on the single photon
rates being observed. The optimum block duration of 30 ms found in this experiment
was in a way a compromise between using larger blocks where fluctuations are averaged
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over and smaller blocks where there are unclear statistics. With an adaptive algorithm it
would be possible to match the block duration more closely to the actual physical SNR
variations during an experiment and thus increase the proportion of good transmission
periods kept even more.
The second idea would seek to examine how the signal (singles rate) is correlated
with the QBER (for instance, by plotting a 3D frequency (z-axis) histogram of signal (x-
axis) versus QBER (y-axis)). With this correlation plot, one could try to predict what
the most likely QBER would be for a given signal level. Then one could apply a finer
filtering scheme, for instance, grouping data blocks into the three classes: low QBER,
medium QBER (< 11%), and high QBER (> 11%). Certainly the high QBER blocks
should be discarded because they actually cost key. But while the medium QBER blocks
may still have a QBER higher than that of the intrinsic system due to background light,
they would still contribute positively to the key. Processing them separately from the
low QBER blocks however would allow one to optimize the algorithms used for each
subset to make them as efficient as possible.
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Figure 6. The simulated secret key rates for a LEO QKD satellite for various elevation
angles and the expected number of background counts and free-space PDTC [19]. We
assume the entangled source on the satellite operates at 100 MHz with an intrinsic
QBER of 2.5%. Negative rates in the shaded region below the 0 axis would produce no
secret key and are shown to emphasize the fact that utilizing the SNRF can produce
a positive key rate where otherwise none would be possible.
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The full power of the SNRF idea is realized in cases with a high background where
the accidental coincidence rate approaches the same order of magnitude as the QKD
signal. Recent work for the case of performing QKD with an orbiting satellite [19]
has shown that one will indeed be operating in a high background regime where the
SNRF idea will prove very useful. Further to this point, depending on the level of
the background noise, the simulations in Fig. 6 show that the SNRF idea can be
used to produce a secret key when the background would otherwise have prevented it.
Fig. 6 plots the secret key rates for exchanging key with with an orbiting LEO QKD
satellite carrying an entangled photon source with a pair production rate of 100 MHz
and an intrinsic QBER of 2.5% for various elevation angles and the expected number of
background counts and free-space PDTC [19]. These initial results show that the SNRF
idea would allow us to generate secret key from many more satellite passes occurring at
elevation angles of 70◦ or less; though a more detailed analysis would have to take into
account the statistics of satellite passes over a year which must integrate over the various
elevation angles. Nonetheless, the SNRF idea should prove particularly useful as the
most probable passes for a LEO satellite occur at elevation angles much less than 90◦
which otherwise would render them useless due to the high free-space link fluctuations,
high background, and low SNR experienced. Thus, we are very confident that the SNRF
idea will prove extremely useful in high background situations such as in satellite QKD,
long distance terrestrial free-space links, or daylight QKD experiments.
6. Conclusions
In conclusion, we have used an entanglement based free-space QKD system to study
the link statistics generated during the fluctuating free-space transmission of entangled
photon pairs. Simulating a free-space channel with a high amount of turbulence allowed
us to recover the theoretical prediction of a log-normal distribution for the statistics
of the transmission coefficient. Using insights from this analysis, we studied the effect
of link fluctuations on free-space decoy state QKD and found that the static channel
approximation typically assumed is valid for the regimes where such systems are typically
operated. Lastly, we studied the implementation of a signal-to-noise ratio filter in order
to increase the overall secret key rate by rejecting measurements during periods of low
transmission efficiency which tend to have a larger QBER due to a higher proportion of
background events to actual entangled pair detection in the raw key. Using this SNRF,
we were able to increase the final secret key rate by 25.2% using the same raw signals
for a particular experimental run. Further, we showed simulations that indicate that the
SNRF idea will be extremely useful in terrestrial long distance free-space experiments
and experiments exchanging a key with a LEO satellite allowing one to generate a secret
key from many passes that would otherwise have been useless.
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